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Abstract
We consider preference relations over information that are monotone: more information is
preferred to less. We prove that, if a preference relation on information about an uncountable set
of states of nature is monotone, then it is not representable by a utility function.
KEYWORDS: value of information, Blackwell´s Theorem, representation theorems, monotone
preferences
1 Introduction
“We would like to see it as a desideratum for normative decision theories that
receipt of new information will always be appreciated.” Wakker (1988)
Understanding the value of information has been in the minds of economists and statisti-
cians for a long time. There is an older literature (e.g. Blackwell (1951), Marschak (1974),
Gould (1974), and Allen (1983)), and a renewed interest in the value of information in recent
years (e.g. Athey and Levin (1998), Persico (1996), and Persico (1999)).
In this paper we make four contributions to this literature. First we prove two impossibility
theorems. We consider preference relations over information that are monotone, in the sense
that more information is strictly preferred to less; we show that, if the state space is uncount-
able, no monotone preference relation over information can be represented by a utility function.
That is, if a decision maker always prefers more information to less, his preferences over in-
formation structures cannot be represented by a utility function. The two theorems account for
the two usual ways of modeling information: through partitions of the state space, and through
σ-algebras.
Our result is important because it shows that utility theory is not likely to be a useful tool
in the analysis of the value of information. This finding should be contrasted with the existing
literature on the value of information, where utility representations are used. The use of a utility
implies that preferences are not monotone. Besides making a contribution to the literature on
the value of information, this result is also relevant for the literature on utility theory. In
particular, economists have long studied the behavioral consequences of the existence of utility
functions. For example, Koopmans (1960) showed that if a utility function for the uncountable
set of infinite paths of consumption exists, the decision maker must exhibit impatience. Our
result shows that if a utility function for information structures on an uncountable state space
exists, the decision maker must exhibit indifference to information.1
Our second contribution is didactic. We give a simple proof of one of our impossibil-
ity theorems when the state space is [0,1]. We believe that this is a better example of non-
representability than the usual textbook example, lexicographic preferences. Lexicographic
preferences are not present in many economic applications, while problems involving the value
of information are common. Our method of proof is essentially the same as that of the standard
textbook proof of non-representability of lexicographic preferences.
Our third contribution is to show that monotone preferences over information are the first
economic example of non-representability that is essentially different from lexicographic pref-
erences. Recently, Beardon, Candeal, Herden, Indura´in and Mehta (2000) have shown that
there are exactly four classes of non-representable preferences, one of which is the set of pref-
erences that are isomorphic to lexicographic preferences. Beardon et al. (2000) argue that all
economic examples of non-representability belong to the lexicographic class; we show that
monotone preferences over information belong to one of the other three classes (concretely, it
is a long line, see below for a definition).
1We thank Stephen Morris for bringing this close connection to our attention.
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Our final contribution is to show that monotone preferences over information on an un-
countable state space are a violation of expected utility. Wakker (1988) suggests that (weakly)
monotone preferences over information might imply expected utility. In light of our results,
this is false. An expected utility maximizer’s preferences induce an (indirect) utility function
for information structures, and our main result shows that if preferences are monotone (and
thus weakly monotone) they are not representable by a utility function.
1.1 Monotone preferences
The maintained assumption in the paper is that preferences are complete, transitive and mono-
tone. Monotonicity in our context means that if partition (or σ-algebra) A is finer than partition
(or σ-algebra) B   the decision maker strictly prefers A 
An objection to this assumption is that a decision maker (DM) who conforms to Savage’s
axioms, and thus has priors over the state space, will not have monotone preferences over infor-
mation if the state space is uncountable. To see this, suppose that the state space is the interval

0   1  , and that DM’s priors are represented by the uniform distribution. Then DM is indifferent
between total ignorance and receiving a signal that tells her if the state 1  2 has occurred or not.
Ex-post knowledge of the state 1  2 may be valuable, but since it is a probability zero event the
signal is worthless to DM.
The source of the problem is not simply that priors rule out a large number of atoms. There
are models of non-expected utility (e.g. Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989))
that allow an uncountable number of atoms. 2 Our result implies that, even for these models, a
representation is impossible.
Still, we believe that monotonicity is a natural assumption for at least four reasons. First, it
is dubious that, if asked, many people would be exactly indifferent between ignorance and the
1  2-signal above. It is, after all, an empirical question: what is the best behavioral assumption
for the analysis of information, Savage’s axioms or monotonicity? The stage is indeed set for
a “paradox,” if people make monotone choices over information they cannot have priors.
The question then arises: how would one test for monotonicity?3 We now turn to this issue,
by describing a choice problem where the decision maker must first choose the information
structure that he finds more useful for a second choice problem involving bets. Suppose that
partition τ is finer than τ  , so there is an element k  of τ  that is the union of a collection  kα 
of elements of τ  Let k be any element of the collection  kα  and kc the union of the rest of the
elements of the collection. The individual must first choose between τ and τ   Then, after he
is informed in what element of the chosen partition the true state lies, he must choose between
the following acts (bets)
f 
	
z if the state is in k
0 otherwise and f
c

	
z if the state is in kc
0 otherwise,
2For example, a capacity can assign positive mass to an uncountable number of singletons. See section 2.4 for
an example with maxmin preferences.
3We thank a referee for raising the issue of how to elicit preferences over information structures.
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where z is a large sum of money. This is basically the 1  2-signal example above. Our experi-
ence in classroom and seminar “experiments” is that an important proportion of people trained
in probability and Bayesian decision-making, like economists, display monotone preferences
in tests like this. For this reason we believe that many people do have monotone preferences.
A second reason why one should study the consequences of monotonicity was beautifully
stated by Wakker (1988) in the quotation at the beginning: monotonicity is normatively a
natural assumption, and therefore, its consequences must be investigated.
A third reason why monotonicity is relevant, is that the problem of whether an individual
likes finer partitions is independent of, and may be more basic than, whether DM’s preferences
accord with Savage’s theory. We may wish to analyze the robustness of a utility represen-
tation, in which case we need to analyze arbitrary preferences over information, and repre-
sentation breaks down. In fact, representation rests on a large number of indifferences; any
psychological wrinkle that could tilt this indifferences towards monotonicity makes any utility
representation break down. In a vague sense, then, representable preferences over information
are non-generic. To illustrate this point, we show how monotone preferences arise naturally
if the individual is a maxminimizer. Since it has been argued that this may happen if DM is
uncertainty averse, the experimental evidence that individuals dislike uncertainty suggests that
monotone preferences may be empirically important.4
A fourth reason why we think that monotone preferences are important is that introspection
and a very wide body of psychological research suggest that information has intrinsic value.5
That is, people value information not only to make contingent plans, but also for its own sake.
Psychologists have long recognized the importance of anticipatory feelings related to the ac-
quisition of information and resolution of uncertainty. For instance, anxiety theory is today
one of the most active areas of research in psychology. Of course, the desire to reduce anxiety
will induce monotone preferences for information.6 Grant et al. (1998) quote a physician as
saying, about tests of incurable genetic disorders, that “There are some people who, even in
the absence of being able to alter outcomes, find information of this sort beneficial.” In those
cases, even if people have priors over the state space, preferences for information will typically
be monotone.
Finally, a comment on the criticism that monotone preferences are uninteresting because
they preclude expected utility is in order. Taken seriously, this view implies that we should not
study any problems beyond the realm of expected utility. Then, a host of interesting questions
such as, just to name an example, the relation between risk and information, could not be
analyzed.7
4See Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) where the relation between uncertainty aversion and maxmin preferences
is discussed.
5See, for example, Grant et al. (1998), Chew and Ho (1994) Ahlbrecht and Weber (1996) and the references
cited therein.
6On the topic of anxiety and anticipatory feelings in economics, see Caplin and Leahy (2001).
7See Grant et al. (1998), Schlee (1990), Schlee (1991) Machina (1989) and Safra and Sulganik (1995) for
more on this topic.
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2 The Non-representation Theorems
One strategy for modeling information is to identify information with partitions of the state
space; in this model, more information signifies a finer partition. In mathematics, this ap-
proach was initiated by Hintikka (1962), and introduced to economics by Aumann (1974). A
preference relation on the set of all partitions is monotone if finer partitions are preferred to
coarser partitions. The second approach is to model an agent’s information by a σ-algebra over
the state space—this approach is common in statistics, but also in economics and finance. A
σ-algebra represents more information than another σ-algebra if it is finer. Preferences on the
set of σ-algebras are monotone if, whenever one σ-algebra is contained in another, the larger
one is preferred.
In this section we prove the main results of this paper: that monotone preferences over
information can not be represented by a utility function if the state space is uncountable. In the
next subsection we prove the result for the partitions approach, in Theorem 1. In the following
subsection we prove it for the σ-algebra approach, in Theorem 2.
Theorems 1 and 2 are independent results, as the two approaches to modeling information
are not equivalent, and neither model is more general than the other (see Dubra and Echenique
(2000)).
2.1 Partitions
In this section we model information by partitions of a set of possible states of nature, Ω. A
partition τ of Ω is a collection of pairwise disjoint subsets whose union is Ω; note that for
each state of nature ω there is a unique element of τ that contains ω. A decision maker whose
information is represented by τ is informed only that the element of τ that contains the true
state of nature has occurred. In other words, the decision maker cannot distinguish between
states that belong to the same element of τ.
A preference relation on a set X is a complete (total), transitive binary relation on X .
Throughout this note, the symbol 
 will stand for a preference relation. A preference relation

 is representable if there is a function u : X  R such that x 
 y if and only if u  x  u  y  .
Let  Ω  be the set of all partitions of Ω. If τ   τ  Ω  , say that τ  is finer than τ  τ  if,
for every A  τ  , there is B in τ such that A  B. A preference relation 
 on  Ω  is monotone
if τ  τ  whenever τ  is finer than τ.
Monotonicity is a natural assumption on preferences: if τ  is a finer partition than τ, then
τ  contains more information.8 The intuition is the following. Suppose a decision maker has
information represented by τ  . When state ω occurs, she is informed of the event B  τ  . That
is, she knows that some state in B has happened, but does not know which one exactly. If
her information had been represented by τ, she would have known that a certain event A  B
occurred. In this case, she could not rule out states in A but not in B, whereas, if her partition
is τ  , she would know that states in A  B did not occur.
8Which does not contradict that τ ff could have more information than τ and not be finer, only that refinement
is sufficient for more information. So, our definition does not contradict the analysis in Athey and Levin (1998)
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We now state our main theorem. It establishes that when the state space is uncountable,
preferences that prefer more information to less cannot be represented by a utility function.
Theorem 1 Let Ω be uncountable. If 
 on  Ω  is monotone then it is not representable.
Remark. Although all the theorems in this note are stated for complete preorders, the proofs
show that the theorems hold for possibly incomplete preorders. For example, Theorem 1 would
say that if an incomplete preference relation is monotone, there does not exist a representable
proper extension.9
All proofs, except that of Proposition 3, are presented in the appendix. To gain some in-
tuition for why the theorem is true, recall that the representation of a preference relation is
always a matter of how large indifference curves are—at one extreme, if an agent is indifferent
between all elements of her choice set, then her preferences are represented by any constant
function. Here, monotonicity of preferences over a large set, the set of partitions of an uncount-
able set, implies the existence of “too many” indifference curves. The proof of Proposition 3,
in turn, gives a more precise intuition for why Theorem 1 is true.
2.2 σ algebras
In statistics and finance, but also in economics (see for example Allen (1983)), the information
possesed by an individual is often modeled through a σ-algebra, and not a partition, on the
space of states of nature. In this model, there is a primitive measurable space  Ω   F  , and
information is identified with sub-σ-algebras of F 
Let  Ω   2Ω  be the primitive measurable space. Let fifl Ω  be the set of all σ-algebras on
Ω. If F   G ffifi Ω  , say that F is finer than G if G is a proper subset of F   noted G  F  The
intuition behind the use of σ-algebras is that if A   B  Ω are not measurable but A ! B is, then
the decision maker cannot distinguish between states in A and states in B; she can distinguish
between states in A ! B and in  A ! B  c. Thus if F is finer than G, then F represents more
information than G.
A preference relation 
 on fi" Ω  is monotone if G  F whenever F is finer than G.
Theorem 2 Let Ω be uncountable. If 
 on fi" Ω  is monotone then it is not representable.
2.3 Theorem 1 junior grade
Theorems 1 and 2 show that utility theory is not a useful tool in the analysis of the value
of information. Besides this substantive contribution, we can also make a didactic contribu-
tion by providing a simple example of non-representability. The canonical example of non-
representability is lexicographic preferences, but the only place students of economics find
lexicographic preferences is in discussions of representability. We believe that preferences
over information is a more relevant example of non-representability. Proposition 3 shows that
9A preorder # is a proper extension of $ if p % q implies p & q ' See Dubra and Ok (2000).
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no monotone preference over information on partitions of

0   1  is representable. The method
of proof is basically the same as for lexicographic preferences.
Proposition 3 Let Ω 

0   1  . If 
 on  Ω  is monotone then it is not representable.
Proof. Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is a function u :  Ω ( R that represents

 . For each x ) 0   1  let
τx *+ y  : 0  y , x  !

x   1   
τ x -+ y  : 0  y  x  !. x   1 /
Note that τx   τ x 0 Ω  , and that τx  τ x, as τ x is finer than τx. But then there is a rational
number r  x  such that u  τx , r  x 1, u  τ x  . Let x  x˜, say x , x˜, then τx˜ is finer than τ x. Thus
u  τx 2, r  x 1, u  τ x , u  τx˜ 2, r  x˜ 2, u  τ x˜ 3
But then r is injective, a contradiction. 4
Remark. Non-representability in general uncountable subsets of R can be proven by a slight
modification of the proof of proposition 3.
2.4 An example: Maxmin Preferences
An expected-utility-maximizer does not have monotone preferences over information. Here we
present an example of a decision problem with maxmin preferences, under our assumptions,
the derived value of information is such that being informed in a particular state makes DM
always strictly better off. Because of this monotonicity, her preferences are not representable
by a utility.
Let Ω 

0   1  and P a set of probability measures on Ω. DM must choose an element
(action) in A   0   1  after observing a signal about the state of nature. Her state-contingent
utility is given by u  ω   a (-56 ω 5 a  2 (e.g. DM is a statistician seeking to minimize the mean
squared error). We will assume that DM is a maxminimizer, so the utility in event B when
action a is chosen is
U  B   a 7 inf
p 8 B 9;: 0 <
B
u  ω˜   a 
p  B 
dp  ω˜ 3
We need maxU  B   a  to be well defined, so that a

B  , the optimal action in event B exists.
For example, if P contains all degenerate priors on Ω, then maxU  B   a  is well defined. To see
this, let B stand for the closure of B   and aB = a  argminω > B  ω 5 a  2   we have that U  B   a 1
u  aB   a ? Therefore, U  B   a  is a continuous function of a   and a

B  , the optimal action in event
B is well defined.
A set P of probability measures over Ω is broad if the set of ω  Ω such that p  ω A@ 0
for some p  P is uncountable. This is the case, for example, if P contains all degenerate
probability measures. Natural choices of P are broad, for example the set of all priors, or,
given a prior p, the “ε-contaminated” set of all εp BC 1 5 ε  p  for arbitrary p  . 10
10This remark is due to an anonymous referee.
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We will assume that DM’s preferences over partitions satisfy the following axiom.
Dominance. If for all ω  Ω,
U  kτ  ω ED kτ F  ω    a

kτ  ω GH2I U  kτ  ω ED kτ F  ω    a

kτ F  ω GJ
and there exists ω˜ and p  P with p  ω˜ @ 0 such that the above inequality is strict, then τ K τ H
DM is comparing two partitions τ and τ J In doing so, she imagines herself in a fixed event
kτ  ω LD kτ F  ω  Suppose she realizes that the utility she would obtain by choosing the τ-optimal
action in any of the states in that event is weakly larger than that she would obtain from the
τ  -optimal action. Suppose in addition that DM believes that, with positive probability, a state
will occur in which, choosing the optimal action under τ will make her strictly better off than
choosing the optimal action under τ J Then she should strictly prefer partition τ over τ J We
shall assume that DM uses Bayesian updating on all priors in P, this is for simplicity, there are
other choices (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1993).
Proposition 4 Let 
 be a preference relation over  Ω M If P is broad, U  B   a  is continuous
for all B   and 
 satisfies dominance, then 
 is not representable.
Remark. If dominance is strengthened so that the conclusion follows without requiring p  ω N@
0, then we obtain non-representation also for expected utility. We use maxmin as a natural way
of incorporating multiple priors, and thus an uncountable number of atoms.
3 Recovering the representation.
Given the negative result in Theorem 1, one may wonder under what conditions one can recover
a utility representation for preferences for information. In this section we discuss the existence
of a representation when Ω is countable, and then present two alternative models that yield a
representation, and comment on their relative merits.
In what follows we will only deal with the partitions model because we believe that this is
the more natural way to model information.
3.1 Countable Ω
It is natural to ask if Theorem 1 can be strengthened to countable Ω. Example 5 shows that
it can not. When Ω is countable, there are monotone preferences over information that are
representable. Example 5 may be somewhat misleading, though. We show (Theorem 6) that,
if preferences are monotone, but individual states are still relatively unimportant, then there is
a utility if and only if Ω is finite.
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Example 5 Consider Ω PO 1  2  i : i  N Q . Any τ 0 Ω  has at most a countable number
of elements, say τ R Ak : k  N  (if τ has a finite number of elements, put Ak  /0 as often as
necessary). Let
u  τ ( ∑
k > N = Ak ST /0
infAk 
Then u represents a monotone preference relation over information on Ω (namely the prefer-
ence relation induced by u).
Let Ω be a set and 
 a preference relation on  Ω  . An element ω  Ω is an atom for 

if, for any A  Ω with ω  A and at least two elements,
 A   Ac


 τ 
U+ ω

  A  ω

  Ac

is satisfied only for τ R A   Ac

or τ R+ ω

  A  ω

  Ac

. A state of nature is an atom if the
decision maker gains relatively little from being perfectly informed about this state—in the
sense that any partition that is preferred over  A   Ac

is also preferred over + ω

  A  ω

  Ac

.
Theorem 6 Let Ω be a set. A monotone preference relation on  Ω  that has an atom is
representable if and only if Ω is finite.
3.2 Priors on Ω and worthless states.
We argued in the Introduction that the existence of priors on the set of states of nature could
imply that preferences are not monotone. We present a simple model where a utility repre-
sentation for partitions arises. Versions of this model are used in many papers on the value of
information (e.g. Blackwell (1951) and Athey and Levin (1998)).
We shall now rule out intrinsic preferences for information, and only consider preferences
for information derived from the role of information in guiding choices.
There is a set Ω of states of nature. DM must choose an action, an element in a compact
set A, after observing a signal about the state of nature. DM’s prior knowledge is represented
by the probability measure µ over Ω, given a probability space  Ω   F   µ  . In this section,  Ω 
will stand for the set of measurable partitions. Let u : Ω V A  R be DM’s (measurable) state-
contingent utility function. Given any partition τ W Ω  and ω  Ω, let kτ  ω  be the element
of τ that contains ω. When ω is realized, the decision maker is informed that an element in
kτ  ω  has occurred. Let
a XY ω 2 argmax
a > A
< kτ 8 ω 9
u  ω˜   a  dµ  ω˜   
so that for each ω, a
X
 ω  is DM’s optimal choice, given her signal kτ  ω  (in fact the selection
a Z[ can be taken to be measurable). We say that a preference relation 
 on  Ω  is derived
from priors if it is represented by a utility function U :  Ω ( R such that
U  τ \
< Ω
	
< kτ 8 ω 9
u  ω˜   a X] ω ^ dµ  ω˜ `_ dµ  ω 
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for some action space A   u : Ω V A  R and beliefs µ 
As a trivial corollary of Theorem 1, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 7 If 
 on  Ω  is monotone and Ω is uncountable, then 
 is not derived from
priors.
To see why the resulting preference relation is not monotone, let all singleton sets be mea-
surable (i.e.  ω

 F for all ω  Ω) and note that all but a countable number of ω have zero
probability. Then, since it is worthless to be perfectly informed in a zero probability event,
DM’s utility is not higher after a refinement of a zero probability ω. Thus, requiring that DM
has priors is like reducing the size of Ω 
Note that the construction of U requires a good deal of faith in the setup. If we wish
to analyze the robustness of the U construction we would need to consider preferences over
 Ω  , and representation is no longer guaranteed.
3.3 Finite Action Space.
The value of more information, of a finer partition, is that DM has less restrictions on her choice
of action. DM must choose the same action at states that she cannot distinguish between,
so a finer partition eases some restrictions and thus must make DM (weakly) better off. If
DM faces a limited number of alternative actions, more information may not always make a
difference—DM will not strictly gain from more information. Thus, a limit on the number of
possible choices has much the same effect as the existence of priors, it limits the value of being
informed in particular states.
The setup in this sub-section is the same as in 3.2, only we now allow for more general
preferences. The set of states of nature is Ω, DM must choose an action in A after observing
a signal about the state of nature. The primitives of the model are a collection a
 B  B > 2Ω of
preference relations over A   and a preference relation 
 over  Ω 3
The interpretation of 
 B for a fixed subset B of Ω is the following. Suppose state ω occurs
and DM is informed of the element of the partition that has occurred, say B  kτ  ω 3 Given this,
she chooses an action that is maximal according to 
 B. Say that aτ  ω  is the maximal action
according to 
 kτ 8 ω 9 . Thus, each partition τ generates a function aτ : Ω  A  Let f :  Ω b AΩ
be the map that takes partitions into functions from Ω to A : f  τ \ aτ 
DM is also endowed with the preference relation 
 on  Ω  , which is assumed to be
consistent with the collection a
 B  in the sense that, if two partitions τ and τ  are such that
aτ  aτ F , τ c τ  
The next proposition shows, as was argued in the beginning of this section, that reducing
the number of actions DM can adopt enables representation of her preferences.
Proposition 8 If Ω is a compact metric space, A is finite, and f  τ 1 AΩ is continuous for all
τ, then 
 is representable.
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4 Preferences over information are not lexicographic
“So the answer to the crucial question in utility theory about whether or not the
only non-representable preference relation is essentially the Debreu (lexicographic)
chain is, somewhat informally, yes provided that we do not want examples based
on ordinal numbers with large cardinality.” Beardon et al. (2000)
Theorem 9 below shows that a monotone preference over an uncountable state space is
essentially different from lexicographic preferences. As was shown in Proposition 3 one can
build an example of a non representable preference relation that makes no explicit use of ordinal
numbers. Still, of course, the reason why representability fails is the large cardinality of the set
of all partitions on Ω : non-representability in Theorem 1 comes from the existence of too many
partitions to be ranked strictly. The existence of a utility would imply that there are “only” a
continuum many partitions that can be strictly ranked.
The dual order of a given ordered set d X   
fe is the order 
 d on X defined by x  d y if and
only if y  x  Let γ be the first uncountable ordinal. An ordered set d X   
fe is long if d X   
ge , or
d X   
 d e , contain a sub-chain which is order-isomorphic to

0   γ  . 11
Theorem 9 Let Ω be uncountable. If 
 on  Ω  is monotone then dh Ω    
ge is long.
Beardon et al. (2000) show that, if dh Ω    
ge is long, it is not order-isomophic to the lexico-
graphic line. So, our non-representation theorem is essentially different from the lexicographic
result.
5 Concluding Remarks
In large sets, the representation of a decision maker’s preferences by a utility depends on the
“size” of her indifference curves. At one extreme, if DM is indifferent between all possible
states her preferences are trivially representable; this is also the case if DM has a finite number
of indifference curves. Preferences over information are typically weakly monotone, in the
sense that more information is weakly preferred to less. We show that if indifference is ruled out
for a large enough set of states by requiring strict monotonicity, there is no utility representation
for preferences over information.
The question of weak vs. strict monotonicity is reminiscent of preferences over sequences
of outcomes in repeated games. The “overtaking criterion” assumes that no outcome in an
individual time period is important, while the “discounting criterion” assumes that a change in
payoffs in any single time period makes a difference. Here, as in repeated games, both assump-
tions have their merit. But, unlike in repeated games, here they give very different conclusions.
When individual states are unimportant (e.g. because of Savage’s axioms, or because there are
few alternative actions) there is a utility, but when enough states are important there is none. In
our opinion this implies that any representation of preferences over information is not robust
to changes in the environment.
11See Beardon et al. (2000) for details.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let  linearly order Ω (such an order exists, for example, let  well
order Ω). For all ω  Ω, define τω   τ ω  Ω  by
τω i+ θ  : 0  θ , ω  !j θ : ω  θ   
τ ω i+ θ  : 0  θ  ω  !j θ : ω , θ  
Note that τ ω is finer than τω, and that if ω , ωˆ, then τ ω 
 τωˆ.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is a utility u :  Ω 1 R that represents 
 .
Then, for each ω  Ω there is a rational number r  ω  such that u  τω A, r  ω A, u  τ ω  . Let
ω  ωˆ, say ω , ωˆ, then r  ω k, u  τ ω l u  τωˆ l, r  ωˆ  . Thus r : Ω  Q is an injection, a
contradiction as Ω is uncountable. 4
Proof of Theorem 2. Let  linearly order Ω, and endow Ω with the order-interval topology.
For all ω  Ω, let m ω denote the Borel σ-algebra on  θ : θ , ω  , and m ω the Borel σ-algebra
on  θ : θ  ω

 To each ω we associate two σ algebras σω and σ ω defined by
σω  m ω !j B !j θ : ω  θ  : B .m ω 
σ ω  m ω !Wn B !j θ : ω , θ  : B m ω o
First, it is easy to check that σω and σ ω are indeed σ algebras. Second, σω  σ ω, as any
 θ : θ , ω

-open set is open and contained in  θ : θ  ω

. Then,  ω

 σ ω and  ω   σω
imply that σω  σ ω 
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that there is a utility u : fi" Ω p R that represents 
 .
Monotonicity ensures that one can assign to each ω a rational r  ω  such that
u  σω , r  ω 2, u  σ ω 3
Now pick any β  Ω   say ω , β  Since any  θ : θ  ω

-closed set is  θ : θ , β

-closed, m ω 
m β. Then,  θ : ω , θ  β  m β implies that σ ω  σβ  Thus,
u  σω 1, r  ω 1, u  σ ω 1 u  σβ 1, r  β , u  σ β   
and r is injective, a contradiction. 4
Proof of Proposition 4. We now show that, if a partition τ is a “one-point refinement” of τ   
then τ K τ   Pick any k  τ  with at least two elements, and fix ω  k with ω  a

k / We will
now show that
τ 
n
l Dj ω

: l  τ 
o
!
n
l Dj ω

c : l  τ 
o
and τ  satisfy dominance (τ is a one-point refinement of τ  ).
Note that for all ω   kτ F  ω    we have that kτ F  ω  \ kτ  ω   and thus
U q kτ q ω sr D kτ F q ω sr   a t kτ q ω urwvxr  U q kτ q ω sr D kτ F q ω ur   a t kτ F q ω srwv3r
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Now, fix any ω ? k  Two cases must be considered.
I) ω w ω  In this case, kτ  ω sLD kτ F  ω yz{ ω   Since P is broad there is p  P with p G ω  N@ 0.
Since ω  a

k  we have
U G ω

  a

kτ F  ω |J} U G ω    a

k ~

<

ω 
u  ω˜   a

k H
p G ω


dp  ω˜ 
 u G ω

  a

k J
, u  ω   ω ( U G ω

  a

kτ  ω G~
II) ω   ω  In this case, kτ  ω  +D kτ F  ω   kτ  ω   Then, by definition U  kτ  ω     a

kτ  ω  hJpI
U  kτ  ω y   a

kτ F  ω y|~
In fact, monotonicity to one-point refinements is all that is needed in the proof of Theo-
rem 1. Thus 
 is not representable. 4
Proof of Theorem 6. The proof makes use of the classical representation theorem of Garrett
Birkhoff (see Theorem 3.5 in Kreps (1988)): a preference relation 
 on a choice space X is
representable if and only if X is order-separable; that is, if and only if there is Z  X , countable,
such that x   y  X , x  y imply that there is z  Z with x 
 z 
 y.
(if) If Ω is finite, then  Ω  is finite and therefore order-separable. By Birkoff’s Theorem,

 is representable.
(only if) Let Ω be infinite and ω  Ω an atom for 
 . There is an uncountable number
of sets A that contain ω and have at least another element. Let p  A 2 A   Ac

and p  A 2
+ ω

  A  ω

  Ac

. Note that p  A    p ; A 2. Ω  and that p  A  p  A  . Also note that there
is no x  Ω  with p  A  x  p   A  . Order-separability would require that there be z  Z
with p  A l
 z 
 p   A  i.e. that either p  A  or p   A  be in Z. Since Ω is not finite, it has
uncountably many subsets like A, hence Z could not be countable. By Birkhoff’s theorem,
there is no utility representation. 4
Proof of Theorem 9. For any ordered set d X   
ge , let  x   y (i z  X : x  z  y

  for x   y in X 
Let  well-order Ω. We shall construct an uncountable collection of intervals in  Ω  . Let
τω  + θ  : θ , ω  !j θ : ω  θ   
τ  + ω

: ω  Ω


Since 
 is monotonic, for all ω , θ   τω  τθ  The collection of intervals ? τω   τ   ω > Ω is well
ordered by set inclusion, as Ω is well ordered. Theorem 3.1 of Beardon et al. (2000) then
ensures that d Ω    
fe is long. 4
Proof of Proposition 8. Let C  Ω   A  denote the space of continuous functions from Ω to A  
endowed with the topology of uniform convergence. If A is finite and Ω a compact metric
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space, C  Ω   A  is a separable metric space (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 3.85)).
Since separability is hereditary in metric spaces, f h Ω ^ is a separable metric space. Thus, by
Debreu (1954, Theorem II) any continuous preference relation on f  Ω ^ is representable.
Let the preference relation  on f h Ω  be defined by aτ  aτ F if and only if τ 
 τ  . A
convergent sequence in C  Ω   A  is eventually constant, as A is finite and C  Ω   A  is endowed
with the topology of uniform convergence. Thus  is continuous. By Debreu (1954, Theorem
II) there is a utility function u : f h Ω ^ R that represents - Defining v :  Ω  R by
v  τ ( u  f  τ  we see that v represents 
UŁ4
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